Beyond Tariffs: How U.S. Antidumping Petitions Reshape Competition

Abstract: This paper examines a hidden cost of U.S. trade protection, centering on the antidumping duty petition -- the primary mechanism by which firms request duties on allegedly dumped imports. Using 47 years of petition data, I document that most U.S. petitions have been filed jointly by rivaling firms, and this cooperation is particularly prevalent among firms with highly substitutable products. Crucially, I find that joint petitions raise prices even when the government denies the petition and imposes no duty, an effect absent when one firm petitions alone. To rationalize this puzzle, I propose a two-stage Cournot model in which firms first decide whether to petition and then compete. The model delivers conditions under which the petition process, by altering the information structure among rivals, raises equilibrium prices.

Draft available upon request